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**MEMORANDUM FOR:** The Director of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State

**SUBJECT :** Proposed National Intelligence Estimate  
on Bloc Military Aid

**REFERENCE :** Your Memorandum of 27 August 1962  
to Director, Central Intelligence

Although my people anticipate trouble in meeting the late October deadline which you propose in reference memorandum in the light of existing estimative commitments, there is no question about the potential usefulness of the proposed paper and I trust that a timetable meeting the Department's needs can be worked out. I understand that the Office of National Estimates has already been in touch with your office on this matter.

(Signed) Marshall S. Carter

**MARSHALL S. CARTER**  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Acting Director

O/NE/

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**CONCUR:**

[Redacted Signature Box]

**DEPT. OF STATE INTELLIGENCE**

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State Department review completed

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

AUG 27 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John A. McCone  
Director, Central Intelligence

*Backward*

As a contribution to its continuing review of problems raised by the Bloc offensives against ~~Less Developed Countries~~, the Department of State would find useful a National Estimate that would evaluate the present and future course of Bloc military aid and economic action in these countries. We now have a large accumulation of experience which should make it worth while for our Community in general terms to analyze:

1. the current pattern of Bloc military and economic programs toward the LDCs;
2. the actual effectiveness of the various elements of these programs in accomplishing the Bloc's purposes, and their effect on Western interests;
3. the likely future strategy of the Bloc in carrying on these programs.

We do not by any means propose a country by country study. We would hope that the estimate would focus more upon the forest than the trees - though of course localized illustrations and analyses will be required too.

A host of subsidiary questions will develop in the course of preparation. I might mention these few examples of points which may well require attention:

- a. the relative weight that the Bloc lays on its military as compared with its economic programs;
- b. the interconnections between the military and economic aspects;
- c. the extent to which changes in program reflect lessons of experience.

For the Estimate to fit most usefully with its planning schedule, the Department would appreciate having the completion date set for late October.

*Roger Hilsman*  
Roger Hilsman

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